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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Here, where the return of the police justice indicated that the defendant
was informed of all his rights, including the right to counsel, the return was
conclusive to all controverted matter within the police justice's knowledge in
the aL.sence of defendant's motion to correct alleged defects therein.1 21
DECEDENTS ESTATES AND TRUSTS
Recovery by Execufor for Services of His Accounting Firm
The compensation which an executor or administrator is to receive for his
services to an estate is set by section 285 of the Surrogates Court Act at a per-
centage of the total value of the property which the executor or adminisrator
must handle in the course of his duties. This section makes provision for additional
compensation for executors and administrators in two instances. First, when the
executor or administrator is an attorney, he is allowed, in addition to his statutory
compensation, reasonable fees for necessary legal services which he has rendered
to the estate.1 Secondly, when an executor or administrator is called upon to
collect rents or manage property of the estate, he is allowed a fixed percentage of
the rents or income so derived.2 If the services for which an executor requests
additional compensation do not fall within the provisions set forth above, the
additional compensation is generally denied.a However, this is not an inflexible
rule, and if special circumstances justify compensation, a reasonable amount will
be given.4
In In re Tuttle's Estate,5 Thorny, an accountant-executor was decedent's
accountant for twelve years prior to decedents death, and at the time of death
was rendering services pertaining to an income tax deficiency suit in which
decedent was involved. Thorny did hot request or receive permission of the court
to continue the accounting services for the estate, but with the consent of the two
other executors and with no objection by decedent's widow (the principal bene-
ficiary of the estate)' he completed his services in the income tax matter and made
an audit for the estate. After he had received payment for services rendered to
decedent prior, to his death and partial payment for the post death services,
decedenes widow began proceedings to oust Thorny as executor claiming that
his charges were excessive and constituted self-dealing. The surrogate found
Thorny's charges for the accounting services to be reasonable and allowed them.
121. N.Y. CoDE CRm. PRoc. §§757, 758.
1. N. Y. SuaRacATi's Couirr Acr §285(b)(7), N. Y. Civ. PpAc. Acr §1548(a).
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3. Collier v. Munn, 41 N.Y. 143 (1869); In re Popp, 123 App.Dlv. 2, 107
N.Y. Supp. 277 (2d Dep't 1907).
4. Lent v. Howard, 89 N.Y. 169 (1882).
5. 4 N.Y.2d 159, 173 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1958).
COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
The Appellate Division allowed a reduced amount which it found reasonable,
and the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.
The Court held that the services rendered by Thomy were necessary to the
estate and because of their nature and extent not within his duties as executor.
From Thomy's prior service to testator, testator's reliance on Thorny just prior to
his death, and the fact that the testator had nominated Thorny an executor, the
Court found it was testator's intention that Thorny continue and be compensated
for the involved accounting services which he was performing.
Cases which have allowed executors extra compensation for necessary services
outside the executor's duties have done so on two grounds: the express or implied
intention of the testator, or the consent of the beneficiaries of the estate. Intention
sufficient to allow compensation has been inferred from testators' directions where
testator directed the executors to choose one of his sons as a manager of his
business and they chose a son who was an executor,7 where an architect had served
decedent for many years prior to his death,8 and where the executor who was
manager of decedents business prior to his death was elected president of that
business and testator had allowed his executors discretion as to which assets
should be kept by the estate.9
The decision in this case makes no change in the rules governing the
compensation of executors, but merely reinforces numerous lower court decisions
which have allowed additional compensation where justly deserved. As the
Court indicated, such allowances do raise danger of self-dealing by fiduciaries,
but that danger is eliminated by proper judicial surveillance.
Wills-Incorporaion by Reference
New York does not permit an unattested instrument to be incorporated
into a will by reference." However, this rule against incorporation by reference
has not been carried to "a drily logical extreme"; and in In re Rausch's Will,12
a disposition to a trust controlled by an unattested instrument was upheld. On the
authority of the Rausch case, dispositions to trusts controlled by unattested
instruments wherein the settlors reserved the power to amend have also been
6. 4 A.D.2d 310, 164 N.Y.S.2d 573 (4th Dep't 1957).
7. In re Davison, 173 Misc. 323, 17 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Surr.Ct. 1940).
8. Russel v. Hilton, 37 Misc. 642, 76 N.Y.Supp. 233 (Sup.Ct. 1902), modi-fied on other grounds 80 App.Div. 178, 80 N.Y.Supp. 563 (1st Dep't 1903).
9. In re Berl, 130 Misc. 527, 224 N.Y.Supp. 466 (Surr.Ct. 1927).
11. Booth v. Baptist Church of Christ, 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E. 238 (1891).
12. 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
